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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
UNITED NATIONS' LAW OF THE SEA
TREATY
LESLIE M. MACRAE*
In the spring of 1982, most nations of the international commu-
nity voted on a final draft of the United Nations' Law of the Sea
Treaty. Only four nations refused to vote for the final draft-the
United States, Israel, Turkey and Venezuela.' The United States
and Israel are among those countries still refusing to sign the treaty.
The Law of the Sea Treaty is an exhaustive attempt to establish an
equitable regime for ocean use, taking into account the needs of
coastal and landlocked countries alike. Much of the treaty is
merely a codification of internationally accepted norms, but the
treaty goes further than conventions which were already in effect
when the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in
New York, December, 1973.2 The treaty is designed to ensure that
the remaining unappropriated resources of the sea (both living and
nonliving) are preserved for all nations as the "common heritage of
mankind."
With the refusal of the United States to sign the treaty, serious
questions regarding the future effectiveness of the treaty are raised.
The treaty recognizes twelve miles as being the maximum width of
the territorial sea--oceanic regions which have been in existence
through customary international law but never codified in conven-
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1. When the voting took place, a total of 130 countries voted for the draft, 17 nations
abstained, and the four nations voted no. For text of the Convention, see United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, reprinted in
I.L.M. 1261.
2. The First Conference on the Law of the Sea took place 1958-1960 which resulted in
the adoption of four conventions codifying parts of the law of the sea. The Second Confer-
ence of the Law of the Sea convened in 1960 failed. Its primary focus was to establish an
internationally acceptable maximum width for the territorial sea. The Third and present
Law of the Sea Conference convened in New York in 1973 and is presently putting the final
touches on the Law of the Sea Treaty.
1
Macrae: Customary Internationnal Law and the United Nations' Law of the S
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
tions. The treaty also recognizes an increased decision-making role
for the international community in determining the use of the un-
appropriated resources of the ocean. Interestingly, the eventual
usefulness of the treaty and its effect on nonsignatory states is not
merely a question of whether the treaty codifies existing customary
international law. Supporters of the treaty are apparently arguing
that the treaty's provisions create new principles of international
law rather than codifying existing norms. This position is signifi-
cant because the United States has taken the position that the treaty
codifies customary international law.
As a result of the difference in approach to the treaty, ques-
tions arise regarding whether the United States will be bound by its
perception of which customary rules apply. Perhaps a more impor-.
tant question is if other countries back out of the agreement due to
the United States' refusal to sign, will any or all of the provisions
remain valid? These questions serve as the basis for this Article:
Have the nations of the world put into motion a new way of treat-
ing the oceans and their resources, or merely codified a movement
begun centuries earlier?
The provisions of the Law of the Sea Treaty are a compromise
between two major theories on the status of the sea and its relation-
ship to the coastal nations of the world. As will be developed, the
arguments of the two greatest theorists on the law of the sea, Hugo
Grotius and John Selden, have merged in customary international
law and the treaty. Without an understanding of these theories,
their origins and their relationship to the creation of international
law through custom, the treaty makes little sense. It is submitted
that those lawyers and countries who believe the treaty represents
new international norms have not taken these origins and processes
into account.
I. FREEDOM OF THE SEAS VERSUS DOMINION OF THE SEAS
In order to comprehend the motivation to codify the legal re-
gime applicable to the oceans, it is necessary to understand the le-
gal and moral justifications which have been advanced to support
pre-treaty ocean law. The idea of freedom of the sea has never
been fully accepted, but rather, as a result of technological and mil-
itary limitations in practice, the world adhered to the concept up
until the middle of the twentieth century.
Ancient Rome and Greece illustrate the historic divergence of
approaches to governing the sea. Each country's relationship to the
Vol. 13
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ocean was based upon written law and custom. In fact, the origins
of today's admiralty law have been traced to ancient arrangements
of the Babylonians, Egyptians and Greeks.'
The Greeks in particular developed a highly structured system
of governing maritime affairs.4 They believed that the acquisition
of property in the sea was permissible not only in the territorial sea,
but beyond.5 Many of the alliances created by Greece had terms
such as "to rule the sea" or "to be lord or master."6
The practice of claiming sovereignty over the sea was exercised
by most of the coastal city-states.7 Athens, for example, openly
claimed as her right domination over the oceans.' Thermistocles
urged Athens to make the sea its own.9 However, the Athenians
refrained from exercising tyrannical power over the oceans. ' 0 Such
a restraint repeats itself throughout the evolution of the law of the
sea, even by those countries most vocal in their support of a domin-
ion theory. In fact, it has been argued that the Athenians favored a
freedom of the sea regime.It
3. 2 C. PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE
367 (1911). It appears that the Babylonians had codified shipping rates, indicating a highly
structured maritime commerce. Likewise, the Egyptians introduced elaborate rules control-
ling and protecting maritime trade around the Nile River.
4. The system of courts called Vautooukau were created which resembled modem
commercial or admiralty courts. Although they did not last long, being abolished in the
fourth century B.C., their function was transferred to the Thesmothetae whose judges were
called nautodicae. Id. at 378-79.
5. J. SELDEN, OF THE DOMINION OR, OWNERSHIP OF THE SEA 53-67 (1972). Selden
traces the concept of dominion of the Sea as practiced by the Greeks from the Cretians to the
Athenians. In fact, he discusses some 18 nations "reknown" in the East which practiced
dominion over the seas.
6. C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 3, at 377. As Phillipson points out, these phrases may
have meant nothing more than a mere temporary dominance. Selden, on the other hand,
apparently interpreted such language as an expression of complete and permanent dominion.
7. J. SELDEN, supra note 5, at 53-69. See also C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 3, at 377.
8. C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 3, at 377.
9. Id.
10. Id. It appears that the Athenians and the Romans recognized that a tyrannical con-
trol over the seas would be counterproductive. This inherent conflict between the desire to
control the oceans and yet permit the free use of them for trade is a recurring theme in the
writings of the free sea proponents as well as those writers, like Selden, who argued for
national control.
11. C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 3, at 377-78. For instance, Phillipson points out that
Pericles passed a decree requesting all Greek residents in Europe and Asia to discuss free
navigation of the seas. Again this stance appears to be contradictory, because Pericles ar-
gued that it was important to have dominion over the oceans. Perhaps, as has been argued
by some writers such as Fenn, the idea of control and dominion really meant policing the
seas to ensure free and safe access for all peoples. See Fenn, Justinian and the Freedom of the
Sea, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 716 (1925).
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Many writers believe that Rhodes later became the chief naval
power of the Aegean Sea. 2 The code which is said to have been
created by the Rhodians is credited with regulating the commercial
enterprise of Greece, and forming the basis for much Roman law of
the sea and modem admiralty law. The existence and importance
of this code has been questioned by some scholars,' 3 but it is clear
that Rhodian law had some effect on Rome's maritime law.
Apparently the first formal pronouncement of the legal status
of the sea can be found in the Digests of Justinian.4 According to
Marcianus, the seas and their coasts were common to all.'5 Be-
cause Marcianus was a jurist with the authority to pronounce the
law of the empire, this may be characterized as the law of Rome.'6
There is some doubt, however, as to whether these principles were
merely national law or an internationally accepted norm. State
policy of Rome may well have varied from that which was stated in
12. C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 3, at 379. See for example Fenn, supra note 11, at 717.
13. See Benedict, The Historical Position of the Rhodian Law, 18 YALE L. J. 223 (1909).
Benedict argues that there is no such thing as a Rhodian Code. Apparently, the so-called
Code was not the work of the Rhodians. The compilation that exists in the work entitled
Rhodian Law, or Nautical Law ofthe Rhodians, first published in 1596, is a fraudulent code
apparently made up of various Greek laws. Benedict recognizes that there was in fact a
Rhodian Law which dealt with jettison of cargo. Benedict also takes issue with the blanket
statements appearing in the writings of authors such as Selden that Rhodian law formed the
basis for Rome's maritime law, conceding only that the Rhodian concepts of jettison were
incorporated by the Romans. Id.
The following is the Digest's reference to the Rhodian law on maritime matters:
On the Lex Rhodia:
(i) It is provided by the Lex Rhodia that if merchandise is thrown overboard
for the purpose of lightening a ship, the loss is made good by the assessment of all
which is made for the benefit of all.
(2) If after a ship has been lightened by throwing the merchandise overboard,
it should be lost, and the merchandise of others should be recovered by divers, it
has been settled that he who threw his property overboard for the purpose of saving
the ship will be entitled to an account of the same.
(3) Where either the ship, or a mast is lost in a storm the passengers are not
liable for contribution, unless the vessel was saved through the passengers them-
selves cutting down the mast to insure their own preservation.
(4) Where, for the purpose of lightening a ship, merchandise is thrown into a
boat and lost, it is established that the loss shall be made good by the assessment of
the property which remained safe in the ship. If, however, the ship should be lost,
no account should be taken of the boat which was saved, or of the merchandise it
may have contained.
(5) Contribution by assessment should be made where property has been
thrown into the sea and the ship has been saved." I S.P. ScoTT, THE CIVIL LAW
270-71 (1973).
14. Fenn, supra note I1, at 716.
15. 2 S.P. ScoTT, THE CIVIL LAW 243 (1973).
16. Fenn, supra note 11, at 716.
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the Digest.'7 The actual practice was to ensure free use of the seas
for Roman citizens. Rome controlled most, if not all, of the Medi-
terranean; thus most of the inhabitants were at least nominally Ro-
man citizens. It has been argued, therefore, that the concept of free
use of the sea was only Roman public law.' 8 If this were true, at
least by inference, it may be argued that Rome also adhered to a
dominion theory. This schism between the theory and practice of
Rome became a focal point for the great controversies between
Hugo Grotius, father of the freedom of the sea theory, and John
Selden, champion of the dominion theory.
The birth of modem international law has been traced to these
controversies.' 9 The beginning of the controversy was rooted in
Hugo Grotius' Mare Liberum, which appeared in 1609. Mare
Liberum was written to justify Dutch participation in the East In-
dia trade.20 Western European countries attempted to expand their
trade routes, but were hindered both by claims of sovereignty over
areas of the sea and papal declarations.2' Due to claims by Spain
and Portugal of monopoly over commerce with the New World and
East Indies, there was little room for expansion for countries such
as England and Holland.22
Although Grotius' work was and still remains the "definitive"
work on the theory of freedom of the sea, two authors preceded
him expressing this thesis. Francis Alphonos de Castro, a Spanish
monk, wrote during the middle of the sixteenth century.23 He ar-
gued that the Benoese and Venetian interference with free naviga-
17. See J. SELDEN, supra note 5, at 77-89. See generally P. POTTER, THE FREEDOM OF
THE SEA IN HISTORY, LAW AND POLITICS (1924). Potter states:
When we turn to state practice in the Roman period, on the other hand, we find
phenomena almost identical with those observed among the Greek states.
Rome herself... attempted to secure, and definely claimed, maritime dominion as
clearly as ... had Athens and Crete.
Id. at 27.
The rules in the Institutes and in the Digest refer merely to the free use of the sea by all
members of the Roman state. They relate to the rights of individuals toward one another in
a single national society. They are not rules of international law at all. Antonious spoke not
of a law of nations but of Roman public law alone. Id. at 30-35. Again we see the conflict
between a nation's desire to encourage free use of the seas, but attempt to exercise and claim
dominion.
18. Id.
19. T. W. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 338 (1911) (Krans to 1976 Wm
Blackwood).
20. Id. at 338-39.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 339.
23. Id. at 341.
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tion of the Ligurian and Adriatic seas violated imperial law, the
primitive right of mankind, and the law of nature.24 Interestingly,
he also argued against the Portugese and Spanish monopolies. An-
other Spaniard, Ferdinand Vasquez, expressed the same arguments
and justifications for a free sea.25
These early writers had little impact on the actual practice of
the nations exercising dominion over the sea. However, Grotius
met with immediate success and impact. Perhaps, as one writer ar-
gues, it was because Grotius appealed to a sense of justice in sup-
port of his thesis.26 As Fulton suggests, Mare Liberum is a
remarkable work. Translated from Latin, it is approximately only
eighty pages in length, but its impact on modern law of the sea is
incalculable. Grotius' entire argument is based upon what he
called an "unimpeachable axiom": 27 "Every nation is free to travel
to every other nation, and to trade with it."'28 Grotius maintained
that the reason this right must remain free is that God created a
system by which all nations must be dependant upon one another
for necessities.29 If countries deny this principle, they destroy
bonds of human fellowship and do violence to nature.
To support his thesis, Grotius relied upon examples of ancient
wars, during which the right of innocent passage was denied.3"
Grotius took pains to develop arguments against Portugese sover-
eignty of the East Indies based upon claims to title by discovery,
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 344-45; H. GROTIus, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (R. Magoffin trans. 1916).
27. Id. at 7.
28. Id. Grotius argues:
God Himself says this speaking through the voice of nature; and inasmuch as
it is not His will to have Nature supply every place with all the necessaries of life,
He ordains that some nations excel in one art and others in another. Why is this
His will, except it be that He wished human friendships to be engendered by mu-
tual needs and resources, but individuals deeming themselves entirely sufficient
unto themselves should for that very reason be rendered unsociable?
Id. at 7.
The foregoing is also a good example of Grotius appeal to logic.
29. Id. at 8-9.
Grotius uses several examples, such as the Bolognese against the Venitians. Interestingly, he
argues that the slaughter of the Aztecs by the Spaniards could have been justified based upon
an argument of the denial of free passage. The same threat of the interruption of free trade
shapes present day foreign policy. For example, the threat of closure of the oil tanker lanes
from the Middle East would result in some armed action on the part of Western nations.
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war or papal dominion.3 More important for purposes of the de-
velopment of the law of the sea, Grotius demonstrated why the Por-
tugese could not claim the Indian Ocean nor right of navigation
based upon occupation.32 According to Grotius, the sea as gov-
erned by the law of nations is the property of no one (res nullius), or
a common possession (res communis), or public property (respub-
lica).33 Ownership patterns were created by man to imitate na-
ture.34 Through occupation, property becomes owned.35 Nations
developed two kinds of property, public and private.36 Public
property belonged to the people in general, while private property
was owned by the individual.
Ownership arises in the same way, whether it be public or pri-
vate. Possession or occupation is the only way property can be
31. Id. at 11-21.
Grotius argued that the Portugese could not claim sovereignty over the East Indies
based on a claim of dominion because they never possessed them. These islands, Grotius
pointed out, had their own governments and legal systems. Neither could they claim sover-
eignty through Papal Declaration, according to Grotius, because it was inconceivable that
the Pope wanted to give two nations one third of the world each. Likewise, the Pope only
tried to solve the problems between the Spanish and Portugese. Further, Grotius argued that
mere donation failed to transfer title without possession. As to title by conquest, Grotius
pointed out that when the Dutch arrived, there was no war between the Portugese and most
of the nations visited.
32. Id. at 22-44.
33. Id. at 22. Grotius Stated:
It seems certain that the transition to the present distinction of ownerships did not
come violently, but gradually, nature herself pointing out the way. For since there
are some things, the use of which consists in their being used up, either because
having become part of the very substance of the user they can never be used again,
or because by use they become less fit for future use, it has become apparent...
that a certain kind of ownership is inseparable from use ...
When property or ownership was invented, the law of property was established
to imitate nature.
Id. at 24-25.
Two important theories are expressed here. First, many of the great writers of this period
relied upon the natural law or Nature for support. Grotius obviously did so, as did his
disciple Vattel. Interestingly, so does Selden in his work arguing for a dominion concept.
Second, this recognition of the natural law sowed the seeds for the eventual downfall of the
free use concept. While Grotius was writing, the sea and its resources were thought to be
inexhaustible. However, by his own thesis, resources which could be used up or damaged
dictated some sort of ownership. This thesis or argument became a central theme for writers
supporting a dominion concept. Perhaps Grotius came to this conclusion himself for limited
areas of the sea because in his later works as will be discussed below, Grotius made such
arguments. Certainly Vattel relied on such a theory to support national control over the
fisheries in some instances. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
34. Id. at 25. It is Grotius' argument that the oceans are incapable of being occupied or
possessed in the sense of real property or chattels which appealed to logic, particularly where
the development of the various coastal states' technology and defenses were fairly premature.
35. Id. at 25-26.
36. Id. at 26.
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owned. From these principles, Grotius drew two conclusions.
First, that which cannot be occupied cannot become property of
anyone. Second, that which has been so constituted by nature, al-
though serving one person, still suffices for the common use of all
other persons-and is today and ought, in perpetuity, to remain in
the same condition as when it was created by nature.37
Consequently, the sea cannot become the property of any per-
son because it cannot be occupied. As Grotius stated:
The nature of the sea, however, differs from that of the shore,
because the sea, except for a very restricted space, can neither be
built upon, nor enclosed; if the contrary were true yet this could
hardly happen without hinderance to the general use. Neverthe-
less, if any portion of the sea can be thus occupied, the occupa-
tion is recognized. . . . Now the same principle which applies
to navigation applies also to fishing, namely, that it remains free
and open to all.
38
Citing Marcianus, Grotius again pointed out that whatever has
been occupied and can be occupied is no longer subject to the law
of nations. 39 Grotius concluded:
Therefore, the sea is one of those things which is not an article of
merchandise, and which cannot become private property. Hence
it follows, to speak strictly, that no part of the sea can be consid-
ered as the territory of any people whatsoever. Placentinius
seems to have recognized this when he said: "The sea is a thing
so clearly common to all, that it cannot be the property of any
37. Grotius argued:
Two conclusions may be drawn from what has thus far been said. The first is, that
which cannot be occupied or which never has been occupied, cannot be the prop-
erty of anyone, because all property has arisen from occupation. The second is,
that all that which has been so constituted by nature that although serving some
one person it still suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today and
ought, in perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when it was first created by
nature.
Id. at 27.
The basic arguments made by Grotius as to the inability of occupation of the sea could be
applied to claims of sovereignty over the moon and planets by national states. It certainly
forms the basis for claims that the sea-bed and its minerals should be the "common heritage
of mankind."
38. Id. at 31-32.
39. See 2 S.P. ScoTr, supra note 15. Marcianus, institutes, Book III:
Consequently no one can be forbidden to approach the shore of the sea in order to
fish; still, they must avoid interfering with houses, buildings, and monuments, be-
cause they are not subject to the Law of Nations, as the sea is; and this the Divine
Puis stated in a Rescript addressed to the fishermen of Formiae and Capena.
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one save God alone." 4
Finally, Grotius took pains to demonstrate why the Portugese
could not rely on prescription or custom to claim the sea or right of
navigation.41 According to Grotius, prescription is a matter of mu-
nicipal law.42 It has no standing in disputes between nations, and
even less standing when imposed against the law of nature.4 3
Therefore, Grotius believed it impossible to acquire by prescription
that which cannot be property. 4 Applying this logic to the status of
the sea, Grotius' thesis was that prescription was unavailable to the
Portugese as a method of acquiring navigation or property rights in
the ocean.
International law, according to Grotius, does not recognize
possession over time as a method of acquiring "public" property.45
For example, a fisherman abandoning a favorite spot after years of
use could not exclude others from future use.' This rule is magni-
40. H. GRoTIUS, supra note 26, at 34; see also 9 S.P. ScoTr, THE CIVIL LAW 299 (1973).
1 think that the shores of the sea over which the Roman people have control
belong to them.
(I) The use of the sea as well as that of the air is common to all men, and the piles
which are driven into it belong to the person who has placed them there; but this
should not be conceded if the shore is damaged, or the future use of the sea is
impaired on account of it.
Id. at 299.
The same conflict between the ownership of the shore and free access of the public to the
sea is being litigated presently in almost all of the coastal states in the United States.
41. H. GROTIUS, supra note 26, at 47-60.
42. Id. at 47.
43. Id. It is interesting that Grotius rejected the use of custom or prescription to deter-
mine the question. Selden uses custom to support his thesis that dominion is permissible.
Although Selden accepted that custom could not define Divine law, he stated in Of the Do-
minion Or, Ownership of the Sea:
But in such things as are merely humane, and humane that they reflect only upon
matters of duties betwixt man and man, and are not forbidden by any command of
God. . .that which shall be permitted by the Law Natural, is no less rightly deter-
mined by the Laws, Placarts, and received Customs of civers Ages and Nations."
J. SELDEN, supra note 5, at 43.
It is argued that Grotius could have taken the same tact with success and may well have
done this in other chapters of Mare Liberum. For example, in his chapter on the idea of
occupation, he supports his arguments using Roman law and arguably custom.
44. H. GROTIUS, supra note 26, at 47.
45. Id. at 53. Grotius makes the argument that since the Law of Nature is based upon
Divine Providence, it forms the primary law of Nature differing from national law, which is
mutable. He then argues that if a custom is contrary to the primary law, it has no power to
effect the law of nations. It is interesting to contrast this position with that of Selden. See
note 43 and accompanying text. For the later pronouncements of Vattel, see infra notes 79-
82 and accompanying text.
46. Id. at 47-48; see also 9 S.P. ScoTr, THE CIVIL LAW 213 (1973). The example Gro-
tius referred to came from Papinianus, Book Digest XLI at 3, where it is stated:
Prescription based upon long possession is not usually granted for acquisition of
9
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fled when applied to actions taken by nations against other nations.
This is because no nation is sovereign over the entire human race.47
Grotius did not believe that prescription and custom were dif-
ferent legal theories.48 He maintained that even if custom were ac-
cepted as theory, it would fail, being diametrically opposed to the
law of nature or nations.49 Custom, according to Grotius' theory, is
based upon privilege, and nobody has the power to convey a privi-
lege which is inimical to mankind as a whole;50 just because a
"customary" use has been exercised for years, it cannot ripen into a
right when in derogation of natural law.5'
Grotius relied upon both Vasquez and de Castro in formulat-
ing the above argument.52 Grotius quoted de Castro's explanation
of the absurdity of claiming a prescription right over the use of the
ocean:
I have often heard that a great many Portugese believe that their
king has a prescriptive right over the navigation of the vast seas
of the West Indies (probably the East Indies too) such that other
nations are not allowed to transverse those waters; and although
the common people among our own Spaniards seem to be of the
same opinion, namely, that absolutely no one in the world except
us Spainards ourselves has the least right to navigate the great
and immense sea which stretches to the regions of the Indies
once subdued by our most powerful king, as if that right has
been ours along by prescription; although I repeat, I have heard
both these things, nevertheless the belief of all those people is no
less extravagantly foolish than that of those who are always cher-
places which are public by the Law of Nations. An instance of this is, where any-
one abandons a building which he had constructed upon the seashore, or it was
demolished, and another person, having built a house in the same place, the former
opposes him by an exception based upon previous occupancy; or where anyone, for
the reason that he alone has been accustomed to fish for years in a certain part of a
river, under the same prescriptive right forbids another to do so.
Id. at 213.
This passage is interesting for another reason. At least tacitly, it is a recognition on the
part of Roman jurists that the Empire's adherence to the principles of freedom of the sea was
more than national law. (Compare note 17 and Potter's argument that Rome's national law
only permitted freedom of the sea for its citizens.)
47. H. GROTIUS, supra note 26, at 50.
48. Id. at 51.
49. Id. at 52.
50. Id. Grotius stated: "Indeed, custom is a sort of affirmative right, which cannot
invalidate general or universal law. And it is a universal law that the sea and its use is
common to all. . . . No one has the power to confer a privilege which is prejudicial to the
rights of the human race; wherefore such a custom has no force as between different states."
Id.
51. Id. at 53.
52. Id. at 53-54.
Vol. 13
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ishing the same delusions with respect to the Genoese and Veni-
tians. Indeed, the opinions of them all appear the more
manifestly absurd, because no one of those nations can erect a
prescription against itself; that is to say, not the Venitian repub-
lic, nor the Genoese republic, nor the Kingdom of Spain nor
Portugal can raise prescriptions against rights they already pos-
sess by nature .... 53
Essentially Grotius' thesis was that because of the nature of the
sea, it can never be appropriated to the exclusive use of any one
nation or any combination of nations. The laws of conquest, pos-
session, custom and prescription which governed the acquisition
and dominion over land, could not be applied to the oceans. God
planned that there be free, international commerce over the seas for
exchange of needed goods.
In other works (one finished in 1604 and another in 1625),
Grotius repeated with some variation his theories.14 Significantly,
Grotius conceded that under certain circumstances, coastal nations
could exercise sovereignty over small areas of the sea directly off
shore for protection." This suggestion, it has been argued, formed
the basis for later claims of a territorial sea and expanded fishing
zones.
Despite the impact Grotius' work had on the early develop-
ment of law of the sea, his theories did not go unchallenged. 6
Many of the theories Grotius expressed, such as his claims that
53. Id. at 54.
54. 1 H. GROTIUS, DE JURE PRADAE (J. Scott ed. 1950). See also H. GROTIus, THE
RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A. Campbell trans. 1901).
55. 1 H. GROTIUS, supra note 54, at 238-39. Grotius, in defining the area which could
not be claimed by coastal states, continued:
The subject of our discussion is the Ocean, which was described in olden times as
immense, infinite, the father of created things ....
Id. at 238.
Moreover, the question at issue [freedom of the sea] is not limited to some bay
or strait located in the Ocean, nor even to the entire expanse of its waters visible
from the shore.
Id. at 239.
While this passage is far from conclusive as to a recognition of a territorial sea, in context it
has been interpreted as such. In his book entitled the Rights of War and Peace published in
1625, Grotius further articulated his shift away from a pure freedom of the sea theory:
It has, however been a fairly easy matter to extend sovereignty over a part of the sea
without involving the right of ownership; and I do not think that any hinderance is
put in the way of this by the universal customary law of which I have spoken. ...
It seems clear, moreover, that sovereignty over a part of the sea is acquired in
the same way as elsewhere. ...
H. GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI 212-13 (Kilsey trans. 1925).
56. T.W. FULTON, supra note 18, at 349-77.
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there should be free fishing in the ocean, were directly opposed to
the interests of England.57 King James had decided to severely re-
strict and tax foreign fishing, and with the appearance of Mare
Liberum, he became quite defensive. 58 William Welwood, a Scot-
tish law professor, replied to Grotius' treatise, devoting a chapter of
a previously published work to a defense of appropriation of
fisheries by coastal nations.5" Welwood argued that a country had
a responsibility to conserve fisheries, and thus foreigners should be
prevented from fishing.' He concentrated on arguing that the
water off the coasts of nations was capable of appropriation, relying
on the Bible and an interpretation of Roman law.6' Like Potter,
Welwood argued that Rome's treatment of the sea as being free to
all, applied only to Roman citizens and not to the international
community.62 While conceding that the open ocean was free,
Welwood cited with approval a 100-mile limit for coastal State
sovereignty.63
Later Welwood published another text which amplified his ar-
guments concerning the right of appropriation to conserve
fisheries.' He used many of the same sources as Grotius, but came
to a diametrically opposed conclusion.65 Relying on human, divine
and natural law, Welwood argued that Grotius had come to "a pre-
posterous notion concerning the universal community of things."66
Relying on a proximity theory, he urged that somebody should
57. Id. at 351.
58. Id. at 351. As Fulton points out, apparently King James was so upset that one of
the King's ambassadors verbally attacked Grotius as he lay in prison, suggesting that prison
was a proper place for anybody expressing similar opinions.
59. See generally W. WELWOOD, AN ABRIDGMENT OF ALL SEA-LAWES (1613).
60. Id. at 71-72. Welwood agreed with Grotius that the open sea should remain free,
but takes issue with allowing free fishing. His stance is based upon examination of the deci-
mation of the fishery off the eastern coast of Scotland. Welwood argues that the Crown must
be able to protect the fish by limiting fishery pressure.
It is interesting that these same arguments still appear to support the exclusion of nonre-
sident fishermen from certain fisheries. For example, the New England states still use this
thesis to ban nonresidents from the lobster fishery. See (1) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 6301, 6401 (1981); (2) N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211:23 (1978); (3) MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch 130, § 38 (West 1974). Of course the same desire for exclusion is seen in the unilateral
creation of exclusive fishing zones by nations.
61. W. WELWOOD, supra note 59, at 62-65.
62. Id. at 69-72.
63. Id.
64. Welwood, De Domino Mario Iuribusque an Dominum pracipe spectoantibus Asses-
tio brevis et methodicco.
65. Welwood repeated his thesis that nothing in Scripture nor international law prohib-
ited an appropriation of a territorial sea.
66. W. WELWOOD, supra note 59, at 1.
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control the territorial sea, the logical one being the adjacent coastal
State.67 God had ensured that the fish around the islands of Great
Britain were the property of the people inhabiting the area.68
Although there were other treatises concerning the subject
(some written before Mare Liberum and some in response to Gro-
tius' work),69 the most important was Mare Clasum, written by
John Selden, an English lawyer. Mare Clausum is an impressive
work in which Selden relies upon divine law, natural law, custom
and examples.7°
Seldon found much in the Bible to support his claim that the
sea was decreed to be controlled by man.7' Quoting Genesis, Sel-
67. The proximity theory was used by Argentina recently to support its argument of
control and ownership over the Falklands.
68. This conclusion obviously aided his patron, the King of England, to justify his tax
on foreign fishermen.
69. See 2 GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIaRI TRES (J. Rolfe trans. 1933). This edition was
published in 1612. According to T.W. FULTON, supra note 18, at 358-59, Gentili was ap-
pointed advocate for the Spanish in the English Admiralty Courts where he argued that both
Spain's and England's dominion extended a great distance from shore. In De lure Belli Libri
Tres, however, Gentili seemed to take a middle ground between the two positions espoused
by Grotius and Selden, stating: "I shall now speak about the sea. This is by nature open to
all men and its use is common to all, like that of the air. It cannot therefore be shut off by
anyone ....
Id. at 90.
But although we say that the use of all things is common to everyone, yet this
opinion also is said to be accepted, that the possession of them may be acquired and
that the possessors may prevent others from using them. . . . But I cannot admit
that view, which by vain circumlocution violates the law of nature. For if the sea
has been opened to all by nature, it ought to be closed to no one ....
Id. at 91.
However, there is jurisdiction even over the deep; otherwise no magistrate will pun-
ish crimes at sea. But there is also a magistry at sea. Such a magistry belongs to the
law of nations and its jurisdiction also; therefore must be everywhere where they
are needed. Furthermore, as regards magistry and jurisdiction that is evident, and
is good law, that very many things are put in the hands of the sovereign on the sea
as well as on the land; and these no one who sails the seas will evade. The sover-
eign himself will bring war upon himself, if he refuses the sea to others ....
Id. at 92.
Another writer of some note, Sergeant Callis, prepared a series of lectures with the curious
title, The Law of Sewers, in which he discusses the King's Dominion at 44-49 (Broderip trans.
1824). Callis reviewed the stature and charters applicable, coming to this conclusion:
So I take it I have proved the King (of England] full Lord and owner of the seas, (a)
and that the seas be within the realm of England; and that I have also proved it by
ancient books and authorities of the laws, and by charters, statutes, customs and
prescriptions, that the government therein is by common laws of this realm.
Id at 48.
70. See generally J. SELDEN, supra note 5.
71. Id. at 18-20. Again it is interesting that both Selden and Grotius relied upon the
Bible and came to opposite conclusions. The use of the Bible and ancient writings of a
religious nature may still be of some value in disputes over claims to territories and territorial
sea boundaries as the best evidence of a custom or practice. In fact, in international law,
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den relied upon the following verse to support his argument: "And
the fear of you, and the dread of you shall be upon . . all the
fishes of the sea."72 The phrase, "fear of you and the dread of you"
was interpreted by Selden as being an expression of dominion.3
He found further support for his Biblical defense in God's instruc-
tion to Adam and Eve: "Replenish the Earth and subdue it, and
have Dominion over the Fish of the Sea, and over the Fowl of the
Air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the Earth."74
Selden then relied upon several verses from the Old Testament
to demonstrate that ancient countries had been granted exclusive
dominion over the sea. In fact several nations, including ancient
Israel, had their boundaries described as being in the middle of the
ocean.7" The most impressive part of Selden's work is the use of
custom to justify his dominion thesis. Unlike Grotius, who actually
used custom to disprove the appropriation thesis, Selden believed
that customary usage and control over the sea justified such acqui-
sition.76 Selden devoted at least seven chapters of his first book to
discussion of the customs of ancient and modem countries which
appropriated portions of the sea.7 He believed that one of the best
indices of international law was customary treatment of a subject
by modem nations.78 In this regard, he appeared to argue that the
clearest proof of acceptance of dominion as the proper regime for
the ocean could be found in the universal custom of treating the
ocean as capable of appropriation.
Following the great debates between Grotius and Selden, there
there is still the vestige of a moral or divine right way of doing things articulated as general
principles of law.
72. Genisis 9.2, quoted in J. SELDEN, supra note 5, at 28.
73. Id. at 28.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 29-42. These pages are of particular interest in light of Israel's failure to sign
the Law of the Sea Treaty. It would be interesting to see what portions of the Bible and
Hebrew manuscripts the Israelies are relying on, if at all.
76. Id. at 42. Selden states:
As to what concerns here the Law Natural, as one head of the universal or Primi-
tive Law of Nations, in our former Division of the Law, commonly derived from a
right and discrete use of Reason; that it doth in no wise gainsay a private Dominion
of the Sea, but plainly permit it, we shall prove hereby; because by the positive Law
of Nation's of every kind, which is humane, (for we have already spoken of the
Divine) to wit, as well by the Law Civil or domestic of divers Nations, as the Com-
mon Law of divers Nations, whether it be in Tervenient, or Imperative; that is to
say, by the Customs of almost all and the more Noble Nations that are known to us,
such a Dominion of the Sea is every where admitted.
Id
77. Id. at chs. 7, 8, 12, 14, 17-19.
78. Id. at 42-46; see also supra note 75.
Vol. 13
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2 [], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol13/iss2/2
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
was an interlude in the controversies. This lull was the result of the
practical problems of actually claiming and controlling large areas
of the ocean. Neither military nor technological advancement per-
mitted effective national control over vast areas of the ocean be-
yond small territorial seas. Grotius' thesis of a free sea beyond the
territorial sea therefore became international customary law by de-
fault as much as through its logic.
In his great work, the Law of Nations, first published in 1758,
Vattel addressed the status of the law of the sea following the de-
bate between Grotius and Selden.79 Recognizing that a country
could become powerful enough to forbid foreign fishermen from
fishing off its coasts, Vattel examined whether that claim was le-
gally justified.8" Concluding this was in fact a violation of interna-
tional law, Vattel wrote:
It is manifest that the use of the open sea, which consists in navi-
gation and fishing, is innocent and inexhaustable; that is to say-
he who navigates or fishes in the open sea does no injury to any-
one, and the sea, in these two respects, is sufficient for all man-
kind. Now, nature does not give to man a right of appropriating
to himself things that may be innocently used, and that are in-
exhaustable, and sufficient for all. For, since these things, while
common to all, are sufficient to supply the wants of each,- who-
ever should, to the exclusion of all other participants, attempt to
render himself sole proprietor of them, would unreasonably
wrest the bounteous gifts of nature from the parties excluded.8'
Recognizing that certain commodities were becoming limited due
to increasing populations, thus forcing nations to appropriate land
to feed their people, Vattel argued that these constraints did not
apply to the ocean.
But this reason [need to appropriate land for food] cannot apply
to things [which are in themselves inexhaustible] and conse-
quently, it cannot furnish any just grounds for seizing the exclu-
sive possession of them. If the free and common use of a thing of
this nature was prejudicial or dangerous to a nation, the care of
their own safety would authorize them to reduce that thing
under their own dominion. . . . But this is not the case with the
open sea, on which people may sail and fish without the least
prejudice to any person whatsoever, and without putting any one
in danger. No nation, therefore, has a right to take possession of
the open sea, or claim the sole use of it, to the exclusion of other
79. E. VAiTEL, LAW OF NATIONS (Scott Chitty ed. trans. 1863).
80. Id. at 125.
81. Id.
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nations.
8 2
The exceptions expressed by Vattel to the rule of no appropriation
of the sea became a basis of justification for the expansion of na-
tional jurisdiction in later years.
Until recently, courts of many jurisdictions accepted the free
use of the high sea regime as national as well as international law.
In Le Louis, the English Admiralty Court accepted this status. In
that case, a French vessel sailing from Martinique to Africa and
back was seized by an English cutter. (Apparently the French ves-
sel engaged in slave trade--though prevented from taking slaves
aboard by the seizure.) In denying the petition for condemnation,
the court stated:
All nations being equal, all have an equal right to the unappro-
priated parts of the ocean for their navigation. In places where
no local authority exists, where the subject of all states meet
upon a footing of entire equality and independence, no one state,
or any of its subjects, has a right to assume or exercise authority
over the subjects of another.8 3
The United States Supreme Court has consistently echoed this
theory. In the case of Mariana Flora,84 a Portugese vessel fired
upon an American schooner approximately nine miles off the
United States' coast. After a naval engagement, the Mariana Flora
was captured and libeled. In reversing the lower court's award for
damage in favor of the Mariana Flora, the Supreme Court sus-
tained the lower court's decision on the illegality of the capture:
In considering these points [the conduct of the American vessel],
it is necessary to ascertain, what are the rights and duties of
armed, and other ships, navigating the ocean, in time of peace.
It is admitted, that the right of visitation and search does not,
under such circumstances, belong to the public ship of any na-
tion. . . .Upon the ocean, then, in time of peace, all possess an
entire equality. It is the common highway of all, appropriated to
the use of all; and no one can vindicate to himself a superior or
exclusive prerogative there. Every ship sails there with the un-
questionable right of pursuing her own lawful business without
interruption; but whatever may be that business, she is bound to
82. Id. This passage is interesting because he anticipated the arguments used centuries
later to justify expanded national jurisdiction beyond small territorial seas to include the
Continental Shelf, expanded fishery jurisdiction and deep seabed mining. (See text below.)
83. 2 Dodson 210, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (1817). However as will be noted, the court
restricts its application to the "unappropriated parts of the ocean."
84. 24 U.S. (I I Wheat.) 1 (1826).
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pursue it in a manner as not to violate the rights of others.85
As late as 1960, the Supreme Court renewed its view regarding
the customary free use of the high seas by all nations. In one of the
series of submerged land cases between coastal States and the
United States, United States v. Louisiana8 6 the Court stated:
"[T]he high seas, as distinguished from inland waters, are gener-
ally conceded by modern nations to be subject to the exclusive
sovereignty of no single nation."8"
The ocean regime, which was established between the early
1600s and the mid-1900s, and forms part of the Law of the Sea
Treaty, was created primarily by the operation of international cus-
tom. It is argued that the "new" oceanic regimes which have been
codified in the treaty are the creation of customary international
law, developed through the extension of older norms since the turn
of the century. Therefore, the treaty is not a revolutionary docu-
ment creating new international law.
II. CUSTOM AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
International law becomes binding on nations generally by
consent.88 There are six sources through which international law is
created. The clearest and preferable way is by universal interna-
tional agreement or treaty. Although some jurists and writers tend
to classify treaties as being something other than true international
law, the better view is that when a treaty is accepted by parties to
the convention, it becomes part of the law of nations:
It is common lay error to draw a sharp distinction between trea-
ties and international law in general. . . . The confusion in the
lay mind has not been dissipated by the common practice in the
United States of referring to international law as embracing only
customary law, which to be sure, includes the law of treaties but
not the treaties themselves. Thus it is frequently said that inter-
85. Id. at 42.
86. 363 U.S. 1 (1960). The submerged lands controversy on a microcosm parallel the
motivations and controversies necessitating the Law of the Sea conference. Both the states
and the Federal Government were interested in being given control over submerged lands
because of the mineral and living resources of the area-a familiar justification for interna-
tional expansion.
87. Id. at 33-34.
88. Pollack, The Sources ofInternational Law, 18 L.Q. REV. 418, 419 (1902).
On the whole then the law of nations rests on a general consent which, though it
may be supplemented, influenced and to some extent defined, by express conven-
tion, can never be completely formulated under existing conditions. This is as
much as to say that the law of nation's must be classed with customary law.
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national conduct is regulated by international law and treaties.
The European practice of distinguishing between customary and
contractual international law and including both types when the
term "international law" is used alone is more helpful. Similarly
clarifying is the European practice of referring to "general" or
universal international law, partly customary and binding the in-
ternational community as a whole, and a "particular interna-
tional law," which binds only certain members of the
international community.8 9
When most of the major powers agree to a treaty, even those States
which have not agreed to the treaty are greatly affected.9°
Another source of international law is termed "general princi-
ples of law."'" There exist certain accepted norms which all civi-
lized nations must adhere to in their relations with other nations.
In fact, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice directs the Court to apply "the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations." '92 When referring to general principles
of law, it has been stated that the Court may go beyond what is
normally referred to as international law:
Taken out of its context, the phrase "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" would refer primarily to the
general principles of international law; following the provisions
in Article 38 relating to international conventions and interna-
tional custom, however, it must be given a different, perhaps one
may say a larger, content. It empowers the Court to go outside
the field in which States have expressed their will to accept cer-
tain principles of law as governing their relations inter se, and to
draw upon principles common to various systems of municipal
law or generally agreed upon among interpreters of municipal
law. It authorizes use to be made of analogies found in national
89. P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 124-25 (1949).
90. Pollack, supra note 88, at 419. Pollack states:
There is no doubt that, when all or most of the Great Powers have deliberately
agreed to certain rules of general application, the rules approved by them have very
great weight in practice even among States which have never expressly consented to
them. It is hardly too much to say that declarations of this kind may be expected,
in the absence of prompt and effective dissent by some Power of the first rank, to
become part of the universally received law of nations within a moderate time.
Id at 418-19.
A very real question arises over whether the United States has made a "prompt and effec-
tive" dissent to most of the provisions of the treaty (see text infra) or is required to if this
treaty creates new international law rather than codified customary rules already in effect.
91. 2 J.B. Moore, PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE CENTURY, THE COL-
LECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETr MOORE 439, 448-49 (1944).
92. See Article 38 of the Statute creating the Permanent Court of International Justice
(P.C.I.J.). P.C.I.J. Stat. art. 38.
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law of the various States. It makes possible the expansion of in-
ternational law along lines forged by legal thought and legal phi-
losophy in different parts of the world. It enjoins the Court to
consult a just gentium before fixing the limits of the droit des
gen$ 93
Application of general principles of law allows the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) flexibility which would be absent if the Court
were bound to custom or treaties in their decision making.
Decisions of judicial tribunals which have been referred to as a
secondary source of international law, also play a part in determin-
ing international disputes.94 The ICJ is directed to apply judicial
decisions in determining a dispute, though reliance is limited by
Article 59, which states that "the decision of the Court has no bind-
ing force except between the parties and in respect of that particular
case." 95 It seems, however, that the Court has been inclined to rely
on its own decisions and those of other international tribunals in
resolving disputes.96 As a result, a relatively new source of interna-
tional stability is being created.
This application may be analogized to the common law sys-
tem.97 Equity, although not mentioned as a source to directly apply
to international disputes in the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, has also been consistently applied by the Court. As Judge
Hudson in a concurring opinion in the Diversion of Water from the
River Meuse case stated:
What are widely known as principles of equity have long been
considered to constitute a part of international law, and as such
93. M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1943 at
610 (1943).
94. ld. at 612-15.
95. Id. at 612. See also Article 38 of The Statute creating the P.C.I.J. P.C.I.J. Stat. art.
38.
96. Id. at 613. Hudson explains the reluctance of the P.C.I.J. to rely on the judicial
decisions of national courts by stating:
In view of the reference to Article 59, the term judicial decisions must include deci-
sions of the Court itself; it includes also decisions of other international tribunals
and of national courts. As to the decisions of national courts, a useful caution was
given by Judge Moore in the Lotus Case that international tribunals are not to treat
the judgments of the courts of one State on questions of international law as bind-
ing on other States, but, while giving to such judgments the weight due to judicial
expressions of the view taken in the particular country, are to follow them as au-
thority only as far as they may be found to be in harmony with international law.
Id.
97. In a common law system, decisions of the same or similar courts within a jurisdic-
tion serve as precedent for future decisions. Despite the provision in Article 59 that the
decision in each case will be binding only on the participants, Hudson points out that Article
39 permits the reliance on prior decisions.
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they have often been applied by international tribunals. . . . A
sharp division between law and equity, such as prevails in the
administration of justice in some states, should find no place in
international jurisprudence.
98
As in cases of equity within the United States, a party coming
before an international tribunal must have clean hands.99
The fifth source of international law is the use of learned trea-
tises, although the ICJ has not used them extensively. In fact, simi-
lar to the use of judicial opinions, the ICJ is to resort to the use of
learned treatises only as a secondary source. 1°° However, as is the
case in common law jurisdictions, courts will look to these sources
when a difficult, novel or evolving principle of international law is
involved.101
The final source of international law upon which nations and
the ICJ rely is custom. Article 38 directs the Court to apply "inter-
national custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
Customary international law has been claimed to be the true law of
nations, treaties being only agreements between specific nations as
to conduct between them. Whether custom is treated as being the
only source, or a part of international law, it is vitally important in
resolving international disputes.
How does a pattern of conduct become customary interna-
tional law? According to Hudson:
98. The Statute creating the P.C.I.J. in Article 39 merely permits the application of eq-
uity to instances where the parties agree to its use. Judge Hudson however appears to have
felt this restriction too unrealistic. HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 231-32 (1943).
99. In Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.)
1925 P.C.I.J., Ser. A., No. 6, at 4, the P.C.IJ. was faced with deciding a dispute brought by
the Government of the German Reich to establish and protect the rights of Germans due to
Polish seizures of German owned property in Poland.
It is, moreover, a principle generally accepted in the jurisprudence of international
arbitration, as well as by municipal courts, that one party cannot avail himself of
the fact that the other has not fulfilled some obligations or has not had recourse to
some means of redress, if the former party has by some illegal act, prevented the
latter from fulfilling the obligation in question, or from having recourse to the tri-
bunal which would have been open to him.
Id. at 31.
100. P.C.I.J. Stat. art. 39.
101. M. HUDSON, supra note 93, at 615 speaks with disfavor of the use of this source:
The teachings of publicists are treated less favorably at the hands of the Court. No
treatise or doctrinal writing has been cited by the Court. In connection with its
conclusion in the Lotus Case that the existence of a restrictive rule of international
law had not been conclusively proved, it referred to "teachings of publicists" with-
out attempting to access their value, but it failed to find in them any useful indica-
tion. Individual judges have not been so restrained in their references to the
teachings of publicists; they have not hesitated to cite living authors, and even pub-
lished works of members of the Court itself.
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It is not possible for the courts to apply a custom; instead, it can
observe the general practice of states, and if it finds that such
practice is due to a conception that the law requires it, it may
declare that a rule of law exists and proceed to apply it. The
elements necessary are the concordant and recurring action of
numerous states in the domain of international relations, the
conception in each case that such action was enjoined by law,
and the failure of other states to challenge that conception at the
time. 
0 2
Acceptance of a treaty by a small number of nations does not create
customary law. 10 3 The central requirement for the development of
customary international law is stability. As one commentator
points out:
[A]s flexible as it is, the growth of custom demands a minimum
of stability. It cannot develop when state activities, because of
their equivocal character and contradictory manifestation, cease
to become crystalized in a general practice accepted as law ....
The margin allowed for abstention, tolerance, the slow consoli-
dation by action of time, recedes when the abrupt development
of new needs impels governments to take unilateral positions
which are often reckless and inspired by an individualistic con-
ception of sovereign rights. It cannot be denied that the tradi-
tional development of custom is all suited to the present pace of
international relations. 'o
Interestingly, these initiatives on the part of individual nations are
the genesis of customary international law.1° 5
Custom is something more than habit or usage, because it re-
quires that those following feel a compunction to do so:
There must be present a feeling that if the usage is departed from
102. Id. at 609.
103. Asylum Case (Col. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 265, 276-78.
104. De Visher, Reflections on the Present Prospects of InternationalAdudications, 50 AM.
J. INT'L L. 467, 472 (1956).
105. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 60 (Waldock ed. 1963) in which he discusses
the evidence needed to establish custom:
The evidence of custom may obviously be very voluminous and also very diverse.
There are multifarious occasions on which persons who act or speak in the name of
a state do acts or make declarations which either express or imply some view on a
matter of international law. Any such act or declaration may, so far as it goes, be
some evidence that a custom, and therefore that a rule of international law, does or
does not exist; but, of course, its value or evidence will be altogether determined by
the occasion and the circumstances.
Id.
As will be discussed in the text below, such individual actions have been instrumental in
forming pre-treaty Ocean Law. See President Truman's declaration on the Continental
Shelf. See infra text accompanying note 156.
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some sort of evil consequences will probably, or at any rate
ought to, fall on the transgressor; in technical language, there
must be a "sanction," though the exact nature of this need not be
very distinctly envisaged. Evidence that a custom in this sense
exists in the international sphere can be found only by examin-
ing the practice of state; that is to say, we must look at what
states do in their relations with one another and attempt to un-
derstand why they do it, and in particular whether they recog-
nize an obligation to adopt a certain course .... o6
There appear to be two conditions necessary for the existence
of customary international law. The first is usage and the second is
opinio juris.1° 7 The practice needs to be one which has existed
without interruption for a period of years. 108 However, there are no
106. J. BRIERLY, supra note 105, at 59-60.
107. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-27 (A. McNair ed. 1928). Oppenheim ex-
plains the relationship of usage and custom:
Custom is the older and the original source of International Law in particular as
well as of law in general. . . . Custom must not be confused with usage. In every-
day life and language both terms are used synonymously, but in language of the
international jurist they have two distinctly different meanings. International ju-
rists speak of a custom when a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions
has grown up under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according to
International Law, obligatory or right. On the other hand, international jurists
speak of a usage when a habit of doing certain actions has grown up without these
being the conviction that these actions are according to international law, obliga-
tory or right. Thus the term 'custom' is in the language of international jurispru-
dence a narrower conception than the term 'usage' as a given course of conduct
may be usual without being customary. Certain conduct of States concerning their
international relations may therefore be usual without being the outcome of cus-
tomary international law.
As usages have a tendency to become custom, the question presents itself, at
what time a usage turns into a custom. This question is one of fact, not of theory.
All that theory can point out is this: Whenever and so soon as a line of interna-
tional conduct frequently adopted by States is considered legally obligatory or le-
gally right, the rule which may be abstracted from such conduct is a rule of
customary International Law.
Id. at 25-26.
For this reason, although an international court is bound in the first instance to consider any
available treaty provisions binding upon the parties, it is by reference to international custom
that these treaties are interpreted in case of doubt. This explains why the Permanent Court
of International Justice, whose jurisdiction has been almost universally invoked for the pur-
pose of interpreting treaties, has largely relied upon and, in turn, made a substantial contri-
bution to the development of customary International Law.
108. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 662, 666
(1953). Kunz discusses the requirements this way:
There must be a 'practice' whether of positive acts or omissions, whether in time of
peace or war. This practice must refer to a type of situation falling within the do-
main of international relations. This practice must have been continued and re-
peated without interruption of continuity. But international law contains no rules
as to how many times or for how long a time this practice must have been repeated.
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time periods set out by the ICJ to measure the minimum time nec-
essary for the evolution of a custom. Certain customs, such as in-
nocent overflight, developed in a very short time.'0 9 Apparently, it
is not necessary for the custom to be humane, nor unanimously
accepted-only a general acceptance is necessary. "0 Consequently,
consent by all nations is not necessary for the creation of a custom.
It has been suggested that a custom becomes binding on States
109. Id. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 105, at 62.
110. Kunz, supra note 108, at 666. Kunz states:
As to the problem of how widely this usage must have been practiced, international
law demands a 'general' practice, not a unanimous one. That shows the un-
tenability of the consent theory, of the pactum taciturn construction. For if it is the
case of a customary rule of general international law, created by general practice,
such norm is valid for new states and for pre-existing states, which hitherto had no
opportunity of applying it.
ld.
Kunz refers to a decision by the United States Supreme Court as evidence of such reliance.
In the Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), the Court was faced with determining if
fishing vessels of belligerent nations were subject to capture as prizes, where their activities
could not be shown to have aided any enemy. The Court, in determining the issue, stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right de-
pending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators ....
Id. at 700.
This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject appears to us abundantly to
demonstrate that at the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the
world, and independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of
international law, founded on considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of
men, and of the mutual convenience of belligerent states, that coast fishing vessels, with their
implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful
calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prizes of war ...
This rule of international law is one which prize courts administering the law of nations are
bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the absence of any treaty or other
public act of their own government in relation to the matter.
Id. at 708.
The dissent is interesting, making the following argument: It cannot be maintained "that
modem usage constitutes a rule which acts directly upon the thing itself by its own force, and
not through the sovereign power." That position was disallowed in Brown P. United States,
8 Cranch 110, 128 (1814). Chief Justice Marshall said:
This usage is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will. The rule,
like other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is addressed to
the judgment of the sovereign; and although it cannot be disregarded by him with-
out obloquy, yet it may be disregarded. The rule is in its nature flexible. It is
subject to infinite modification. It is not an immutable rule of law, but depends on
political considerations which may continually vary.
Id.
The dissent essentially echoes the Grotian thesis that customary international law is suspect,
while the majority recognized that customary international law operates on nations which
have not specifically rejected the rule.
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which come into existence following the development of a custom,
and on those pre-existing States which had no opportunity to apply
it. I '
Usage must be combined with what Kunz calls opinio juris:"2
the custom must be applied with the belief and acquiescence that it
is binding."' Essentially, the nations applying the custom must do
so as if it were international law, and other nations must not oppose
its application." 4
Evidence of customary law may be found in diplomatic corre-
spondence, instructions, municipal law, court decisions, treaties, ne-
gotiation, international decisions and the practice of international
organizations." 5 However, expressions of diplomats, for example,
must be examined in order to ascertain whether or not it contains
merely a political statement or the actual policy of the nation." 6
What does customary international law permit as far as appro-
priation of the seas? Vattel (often called the father of modern inter-
national law) believed it impossible, contrary to Grotius, to
appropriate portions of the sea through prescription:
As the rights of navigation and of fishing, and other rights which
may be exercised on the sea, belong to the class of those rights
ability, which are imprescriptible, they cannot be lost by want of
seas. Consequently, although a nation should happen to have
been, from time immemorial, in sole possession of the navigation
and fishing in those seas, it cannot, on this foundation, claim an
exclusive right to those advantages. For, though others have not
made use of their common right to navigation and fishery in
those seas, it does not thence follow that they have any intention
to renounce it; and they are entitled to exert it whenever they
think proper.17
However, as will be determined later, most commentators and
jurists have recognized the customary appropriation of territorial
seas. Many commentators feel it is customary law to allow unilat-
eral determination of the widths of territorial seas.
11I. See the position taken by Kunz, supra note 110 and accompanying text. See also
Pollack, supra note 88, at 418-19.
112. Kunz, supra note 108 and accompanying text. See Kunz, supra note 110 and ac-
companying text. See also L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 107 and accompanying text.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
114. Kunz, supra note 108, at 667.
115. J. BRIERLY, supra note 105, at 60-61. See Kunz, supra note 108, at 667-68.
116. Kunz, supra note 108, at 667-68.
117. E. VATrEL, supra note 79, at 126.
Vol. 13
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III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS ROLE IN PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE LAW OF THE SEA
Custom has played an important role in the creation of the law
of the sea. The ICJ has relied upon customary international law as
the basis for its decisions in several important law of the sea cases.
The Court, for example, relied upon its interpretation of customary
international law in declaring that nations, during times of peace,
may send warships through international straits. ",8 The Court also
relied upon custom to delineate boundaries of coasts having irregu-
lar shorelines.' ' In addition to the ICJ, many nations recognized
the importance of customary rules of international law and their
relationship to the oceans.
Many of the pretreaty ocean regimes which developed through
the centuries and according to customary international law, were
codified by treaties in the 1960s and 1970s.120 The concept of free
use of the high seas became the norm through court decisions, gen-
eral acceptance and treaty. Likewise, the concept of the territorial
sea developed through the same processes.
Claims to exclusive control of territorial seas grew from the
need for security. The territorial sea provided easy access to the
inland water and land mass of coastal States.' 2 ' Although the
118. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 1. In this case, British warships
had been damaged using the Corfu Channel in October 1946 and Britain sought to receive
compensation. See infra text accompanying note 169.
119. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 1.C.J. 116, 142. This case arose because of Nor-
way's delimitation of a fisheries zone which used a straight baseline method. In reference to
Britain's argument that this unilateral determination was void, the I.C.J. stated:
It does not at all follow that, in the absence of rules having the technically precise
character alleged by the United Kingdom Government, the delimitation under-
taken by the Norwegian Government in 1935 is not subject to certain principles
which make it possible to judge as to its validity under international law. The
delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent
merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Al-
though it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because
only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation
with regard to other states depends upon international law.
Id. at 132.
120. See Convention on the High Sea, Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Sept. 10, 1964,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Continental Shelf,
June 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resource of the High Seas, March 20, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 138,
T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
121. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 176-77
(1962), wherein the authors state:
The exclusive interest of particular states in the territorial sea arises principally
from the fact that this area, like internal waters, affords an important means of
25
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threat imposed by modem weapons makes such a buffer zone less
important to national security, it is still through or over the territo-
rial sea that navy enemy weapons must travel. In addition, many
of the rich fishing banks or migration patterns of fishes of the world
are situated close to the shores of coastal States, which heightens
the desire to protect these resources through acquisition.' 2
Grotius recognized the need for such a zone stating, "the ques-
tion at issue (sovereignty over the sea) does not concern a gulf or a
strait in the Ocean, nor even all the expanse of sea which is visible
from the shore."' 12 3 Curiously, this acceptance of a territorial sea by
Grotius was supported by Selden, based upon customary actions of
State. Although Grotius rejected custom as a method of appropria-
tion for most areas, he apparently accepted it as a basis of acquiring
a territorial sea. In fact Vattel, a disciple of Grotius, accepted the
customary right of appropriation of a territorial sea:
The various uses of the sea near the coasts render it very suscep-
tible of property. It furnishes fish, shells, pearls, amber, etc.
Now, in all these respects, its use is not inexhaustible: Wherefore
the nation, to whom the coasts belong, may appropriate to them-
selves, and convert to their own profit, an advantage which na-
ture has so placed within their reach as to enable them
conveniently to take possession of it, in the same manner as they
possessed themselves of the dominion of the land they inhabit.
Who can doubt that the pearl fisheries of Bahrein and Ceylon
may lawfully become property? And though, where the catching
of fish is the only object, the fishery appears less liable to be ex-
hausted, yet if a nation have on their coasts a particular fishery
of a profitable nature, and of which they may become masters,
shall they not be permitted to appropriate to themselves that
bounteous gift of nature . .124
Vattel went on to address the security aspect of extending national
control over the territorial sea. His explanation of what intema-
access to coastal land masses. In the recent past this factor of facilitating access to
the state has had a very considerable weight for the coastal state, since the oceans
have served as a most convenient, and sometimes necessary, highway over which
attacks and threats of attack could be launched by rival states. It would perhaps be
a mistake to assume because of contemporary spectacular developments in the
technology of transportation, of weapons, and of weapons delivery systems, that
this value of the ocean as a means of access has entirely disappeared.
Id. at 177.
122. Id. at 177-78. It hardly requires mention that control over fisheries within or near
the territorial seas of coastal nations have caused dissention between nations. See supra note
119 and accompanying text.
123. H. GROTIUS, supra note 54, at 239.
124. E. VATTEL, supra note 79, at 127.
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tional law permits seems to be a justification of such extensions as a
customary right of nations:
A nation may appropriate to herself those things for which the
free and common use would be prejudicial or dangerous to her.
This is a second reason for which governments extend their do-
minion over the sea along their coasts as far as they are able to
protect their rights. It is of considerable importance to the safety
and welfare of the state that a general liberty be not allowed to
all comers to approach so near their possessions, especially with
ships of war. . . . These parts of the sea, thus subject to a na-
tion, are comprehended in her territory; nor must one navigate
without her consent. But, to vessels that are not liable to suspi-
cion, she cannot, without a breach of duty, refuse permission to
approach for harmless purposes, since it is a duty incumbent on
125every proprietor to allow to strangers a free passage ... .
The breadth, not the existence of a territorial sea has been the
focal point for international dispute. Early writers such as Vattel
had trouble delineating the proper width of the territorial sea.
12 6
There was little agreement between writers or nations on the proper
width.' 2 Gradually, however, a concensus developed in the 1800s.
The measurement most often applied was the distance which a can-
non ball could be shot, which was approximately one marine
league or three nautical miles. The cannon ball rule was first pro-
posed in 1703 by Cornelius von Bynkershoek. 28 Relying in part on
Grotius' theory that the oceans generally remained unappropriable,
von Bynkershoek argued that only the seas which could be con-
trolled by shore-based artillery should become part of the territorial
sea. 129
125. Id. at 127-28.
126. Id. at 128.
127. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the three-mile limit, see T.W. FULTON,
supra note 18, at 576-603. See generally P. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND
MARITIME JURISDICTION (1927).
128. T.W. FULTON, supra note 18, at 555.
129. C. BYNKERSHOEK, DE DoMINIO MARIS DISSERTATIO (J. Scott ed. 1923). This par-
ticular text was published in 1744, but Bynkershoek reiterated his position on the proper
width. It is an excellent presentation of arguments about the sovereignty of the sea which
critically analyzes both the Grotian and Seldonian theories. Bynkershoek stated:
Some authorities extend it [width of the territorial sea] to a hundred miles, some to
sixty; for both classes see Bodin, Selden, and, to add him also, Pacius. Some extend
it to a two days' voyage, as you may learn, if it is worthwhile from Hieronynus of
Brescici. Others again set various other limits; for these see Gryphiander. But no
one could easily approve the reasoning on which all these rules are based, or that
reasoning either by which it is accepted that dominion over the sea extends as far as
the eye can see ...
Wherefore on a whole it seems a better rule that control of the land [over the seas]
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The three-mile width, although never fully accepted by all na-
tions, became as close as any distance to be deemed customary in-
ternational law. Gradually, however, nations became aware that
their security needs and the requirements for protein and other re-
sources from the sea would be better served through increased terri-
torial seas. Although McDougal and Burke argue that few nations
claimed, nor would international law permit, the unilateral deter-
mination of coastal territorial seas, there appears to be some sup-
port from such writers as Vattel for such a regime.'
30
Vattel argued that a nation had a right to appropriate the re-
sources of the sea off the coast when the coastal State believed it to
be threatened. 13' This right arguably emanates from the basic law
that a nation has the right to insure its survival. The right of a
nation to so expand its seas seems defensible when taken for secur-
ity or economic survival purposes' 32-although it may be correct to
state that such expansion was not until recently met with the con-
sent required to elevate the power to a rule of customary law.
A status quo gradually developed which seemed to state that
the international community would recognize a three-mile limit,
and would tolerate greater expansions when no infringement on
important rights of other nations resulted. Due to the uncertainty
extends as far as cannon will carry; for that is as far as we seem to have both
command and possession. I am speaking, however, of our own times, in which we
use those engines of war; otherwise I should have to say in general terms that the
control from the land ends where the power of men's weapons ends; for it is this, as
we have said, that guarantees possession. This seems to have been the opinion
followed by the Estates of the Belgio Confederation who decreed. . . that the com-
manders of vessels off the coast of foreign princes should salute at sea as far out as
cannon will carry from their cities and forts, according as the prince of the shore in
question might prescribe ....
Id. at 43-44.
130. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 121, at 489-90. See E. VATrEL,supra note
79, at 127-28.
131. E. VATTEL, supra note 79, at 127-28.
132. See as an example of how this occurs, Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine
Areas, 27 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 376 (1950). Lauterpacht examines the genesis of control by
coastal nations over their resources of the Continental Shelf, discussing the theory of con-
tinuity as the legal basis for such control. In discussing the evolution of customary law per-
mitting such additions, Lauterpacht states:
All these considerations explain why, independently of any legal doctrine the
appropriation-or, which is essentially the same, the right of appropriation--of the
adjacent submarine areas have become part of international law by custom initi-
ated by the leading maritime powers and acquiesced in by the generality of states.
The law creating-or law revealing---effect of that practice and of the absence of
protest against it are emphasized by the circumstance that, as has been submitted,
that practice is not only in conformity with a reasonably conceived notion of the
freedom of their sea, but also that it adds vitality to it by demonstrating its capacity
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of the varying claims toward the end of the nineteenth century, a
movement began which was designed to reach a consensus on the
proper width of the territorial sea. 133 Several attempts were made
to either expand or continue the three-mile limit, but each met with
little success.1 34 During these efforts, the first coordinated sugges-
tions for expansion of control which would be less than sovereignty
beyond a territorial sea were advanced. 135 In preparation for the
1930 Codification Conference, at least two reports from the sub-
committees of experts for the progressive development of interna-
tional law were presented. 136  These reports differed in their
conclusions as to the correct width of the territorial sea.' 3 7 In re-
sponse to a questionnaire sent to the various coastal States, a ma-
jority reported their acceptances of the three-mile limit.
138
Regardless, it became evident that there was in fact no consensus
on the proper limit to the territorial sea's breadth. 139
133. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 121, at 521-48 for a detailed discus-
sion of the process.
134. Id. See W. BEWES, TRANSACTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION
1878-1924, at 233 (1925). The International Law Association recommended a six-mile terri-
torial sea. See also J. B. ScoTT, RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
113 (1916). The Institute also recommended a six mile territorial sea, stating:
Considering that there is no reason to confound in a single zone the distance
necessary for the exercise of sovereignty and for the protection of coastwise fishing
and that which is necessary to guarantee the neutrality of non-belligerents in time
of war,
That the distance most generally adopted of three miles from low-water mark
has been recognized as insufficient for the protection of coastwise fishing;
That this distance moreover does not correspond to the actual range of guns
placed on the coast;
Has adopted the following provision:
Article 2 The territorial sea extends six marine leagues. from the low-water
mark along the full extent of the coasts.
Id at 113-14.
135. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 121, at 520-21. See Harvard Law School,
Draft Conventions on Nationality Responsibility of States, and Territorial Waters, 1929 Ap-
pendix No. 2, 368.
136. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 121, at 522-23.
137. Id. The Schucking report proposed a six mile wide territorial sea. It is interesting
because the report stated, "the theory most widely accepted accords to the riparian State the
right to extend the limit of its territorial sea to the range of coastal guns by unilateral acts."
Refusing to concede that the rules of customary law should play a role, the report rejected
such a stance saying such a rule would create an intolerable restriction on the freedom of the
sea concept. The other report, written by M. Magalles of Portugal, suggested a twelve-mile
limit. Id.
138. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 121, at 524. See generally Heinzen, The
Three Mile Limit.- Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, II STAN. L. REV. 597 (1959).
139. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 121, at 524-25. McDougal and Burke
make the following statement:
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By the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, however, many
of the nations, including the United States and the United King-
dom which had historically been the strongest supporters of the
three-mile limit, expressed support for a wider measurement." 4°
This support by the United States and United Kingdom, although
conditioned on an acceptance of the increased width by the Confer-
ence, reflected a growing desirability of appropriating the sea's re-
sources for exclusive use. Three proposals were voted on and
rejected.' 4 ' The proposals suggested widths from six to twelve
miles with some including measures for limited control over fishing
beyond the limitations.'42 The final United States proposal in-
cluded a six-mile territorial sea with a six-mile fishing zone beyond
the outer boundary of the territorial sea.' 4 3 Although this proposal
found more support than the others, the Conference adjourned
without agreeing on a proper width.'"
Another conference was convened in 1960, designed to reach a
consensus on a breadth for the territorial sea. 145 Unfortunately,
there was no agreement on the proper breadth of the zone, though a
joint Canadian-American proposal needed but one vote to be
adopted.'" That proposal provided for a six-mile territorial sea
and an additional exclusive fishing zone up to twelve miles wide. 1
47
In addition, two other provisions were added. The first
grandfathered all vessels which had fished in the outer six miles of
One result of the 1930 Conference was, however, to cast a degree of doubt
upon the notion that states could not lawfully claim a territorial sea broader than
three miles. While it is, or ought to be, clear that unanimity is not necessarily an
indispensable characteristic of the concensus that is often termed a prerequisite of
customary international law, the potential seriousness of the differences about the
width of the territorial sea. . . magnified the importance of the minority views on
this point and contributed to a growing feeling that the degree of concensus on the
three-mile rule was not sufficiently marked to warrant its definitive categorization
as part of customary international law.
Id. at 524-25.
McDougal and Burke correctly noted the emerging trend which is now customary interna-
tional law, that states may unilaterally extend jurisdiction over the waters and seabed off
their coasts where matters of necessity require it.
140. Id. at 529-30. See also Heinzen, supra note 138, at 654-55.
141. See M. McDOUOAL & W. BURKE, supra note 121, at 529 for a discussion of the
proposals. See also Heinzen, supra note 138, at 654-55.
142. M. McDOUOAL & W. BURKE, supra note 121, at 529-32.
143. Id. at 531-32.
144. Id. at 539. In fact, the eventual convention adopted in 1958 provided for no de-
lineation. See Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law ofthe Sea: The Fightfor
Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 751 (1960).
145. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 121, at 538-48.
146. Id. at 547.
147. Id. at 543.
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the fishing zone for five years. 48 The second addition provided for
dispute settlement using the procedures established in the 1958
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas. These conferences clearly evidenced the growing
movement for an exclusive fishing zone. Likewise, despite the fail-
ure of the two conferences to settle on any particular width, both
the 1958 and 1960 conferences indicated a trend in international
law to accept a territorial sea greater than three miles in width.
At the beginning of the 1958 Conference, only twenty-seven
countries claimed a territorial sea in excess of three miles or one
league. 49 Using the United Nations' compilation of territorial
seas150 published in 1970 and the 1958 figures for States which did
not report in 1970, it is evident there was a dramatic shift in the
number of States claiming more than three miles. In 1970, at least
fifty-eight nations claimed territorial seas in excess of three miles,
while only twenty-three countries claimed the three-mile limit. Be-
tween 1958 and 1970, the number of countries claiming more than
three miles went from seventeen to fifty-eight. Forty-one, or more
than half of those countries claiming more than three miles,
claimed twelve or more miles.' 5 ' Without belaboring the point, it is
evident that most nations were apparently applying the theory that
unilateral determination of territorial seas was proper under cus-
tomary international law.
With the preliminary signing of the Law of the Sea Treaty in
May, 1982, unilateral extension of the territorial sea theory was re-
jected by the signatories in favor of a twelve-mile limit. Two im-
portant consequences flow from this action. First, the decision to
support the twelve-mile limit was part of an intricate set of com-
promises between developed and undeveloped States. Part of the
compromise provided for extended jurisdiction over fisheries and
other living resources and an exclusive economic zone in return for
the limitation on the territorial sea. Those nations giving up claims
to the extended territorial sea thus made their acceptance based
148. Id. at 543-44.
149. Heinzen, supra note 138, at 64142.
150. United Nation's Legislative Series-National Legislative and Treaties Relating to
the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, The Continental Shelf, The High Seas and to Fish-
ing Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, 57/LC6/SER. B/15 (1970).
151. By 1977, according to information published by the Geographer of the United
States Department of State, 26 nations claimed a three-mile limit, while one hundred nations
claimed territorial seas in excess of three miles. Of the one hundred nations claiming greater
than three miles, sixty claimed twelve miles.
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upon such a compromise. With only four countries refusing to sign
the new treaty, it is arguable that regardless, all nations will be sub-
ject to the expanded jurisdiction based on customary international
law.
The United States has taken this position, in effect, by the
statement of the Acting Head of the United States delegation to the
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, Thomas Clingan, on
September 22, 1982. He stated that the Law of the Sea Treaty
merely codified much existing international customary law. (Pre-
sumably he did not include the deep sea bed mining provisions
within this category.) He took issue with those suggesting that the
treaty was new law, and that its provisions were a take-it-or-leave-it
proposition. Those nations supporting the view that the Law of the
Sea Treaty is a new set of principles are accepting in the form of a
contractual agreement. If this were the case, and the document
were truly a contract or treaty encompassing new rules, any country
refusing to sign would not be bound by its provisions in any sense
through the operation of customary international law.
It is submitted that the United States' position is correct.
Those countries desiring implementation of the treaty as a contract
run the risk of making the document ineffectual, or delaying its
general application to nonconsenting nations. Even those, such as
Pollack, who argue that general acceptance through a treaty of all
or most of the great powers of general principles, recognize that
those generally accepted principles must have a basis in customary
rules of international law. If the supporters of the treaty accept the
United States' formulation, the United States would be faced with
the proposition that rules of customary international law which
have been incorporated in the treaty are mandatory.
152
While the advent of the nineteenth century brought about an
ever-increasing reliance on treaties for the formation of interna-
tional law, the influence of custom has not been eliminated. John
Bassett Moore remarked that when a certain rule of law is embod-
ied in a series of treaties between leading powers, it assumes the
character of a principle of international law. 153 Many commenta-
tors have been reluctant to express the opinion that treaty provi-
sions could ever be applied as general international law because it
would present the seemingly impossible task of ever reaching an
152. Pollack, supra note 88, at 418-19.
153. J.B. MOORE, supra note 91, at 445.
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agreement on a treaty by a large majority of nations.'54 This prob-
lem does not appear to exist with the Law of the Sea Treaty if the
United States' position is accepted.
If the United States argues that the twelve-mile limit for terri-
torial seas is inapplicable to the United States in its relations with
nations, signatories of the Law of the Sea Treaty will face
problems. The almost unanimous consent of the international
community to the increased limits presents a strong case for a gen-
eral principle of international law created by treaty.'55 In addition,
the overwhelming trend for increased width of territorial seas
which developed after the 1958 convention would indicate that the
evolution of an increased territorial sea through customary law has
been established. While the United States may rightfully choose
not to extend her limits, it would appear that an international tribu-
nal would require respect of the new limits of other States.
An interesting problem is created if the refusal of the United
States to sign the treaty results in other nations deciding to with-
draw. Is there a new, internationally recognized breadth for the
territorial sea; or, would there be a new customary rule permitting
the unilateral delimitation of the territorial sea?
A strong case can be made for the imposition of a twelve-mile
limit as a new customary width. As shown above, a majority of
nations adopted twelve miles as the proper measurement in the
treaty. Despite the fact that such agreement was partially a com-
promise, the fact remains that sentiment and necessity called for an
expanded area. Even countries such as the United States have cre-
ated nearly complete sovereignty over large areas offshore, while
maintaining the fiction of a three-mile limit.
This expansion on the part of the United States began in 1945
with President Truman's Presidential Proclamation No. 2667,
which established policy governing the Continental Shelf. 156 Tru-
man resorted to the same type of justification that Vattel had ex-
pressed as being the conditions which would justify a nation's
unilateral expansion of the patrimonial sea:
Whereas the Government of the United States of America,
154. Kerno, International Law and International Organization Prospects For the Future,
1952 A.S.I.L. Proc. 12, 13. See also Pollack, supra note 88, at 418-19.
155. Kerno, supra note 154, at 13. As Kerno illustrates, when the International commu-
nity agrees on a Treaty, it can be used to show a general customary rule of law. By not so
arguing, nations urging the signing of the LOS Treaty as a contract, have negated the value
of this forum's prestige to require conforming practice of non-signing nations.
156. Pres. Res. of Sept. 28, 1945, No. 2667, 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
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aware of the long range world-wide need for new sources of pe-
troleum and other minerals, holds the view that efforts to dis-
cover and make available new supplies of these resources should
be encouraged ...
Whereas recognized jurisdiction over these resources is required
in the interest of their conservation and prudent utilization when
and as development is undertaken; ....
NOW THEREFORE I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the
United States of America, do hereby proclaim the following pol-
icy of the United States of America with respect to the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf.
Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently
utilizing its natural resources, the Government of the United
States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of
the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the
coasts of the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and
control. '
57
The proclamation was followed by the passage of the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Land Acts which codified the policy expressed in Tru-
man's proclamation.
m5
In 1976, the Fishery Conservation Management Act (FCMA)
was adopted. 5 9 The FCMA created a fishing zone extending two
hundred miles from shore, controlled by regional fishing coun-
cils.' 6° Foreign fishing is severely restricted.' 6' A familiar theme
was repeated in the Legislature's purpose and policy section:
Sec. 2(a) The Congress finds and discloses the following:
(1) The fish off the coasts of the United States. . . the species
which dwell on or in the Continental Shelf appertaining to the
United States. . . constitute valuable and renewable natural re-
sources. These fishery resources contribute to the food supply,
economy, and health of the Nation. ...
(2) As a consequence of increased fishing pressure and because
of the inadequacy of fishing conservation and management prac-
tices and controls (A) certain stocks of such fish have been
overfished to the point that their survival is threatened. ...
(3) Commercial and recreational fishing constitute a major
source of employment and contribute significantly to the econ-
omy of the Nation. . ..
157. Id.
158. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
159. Fishery Conservation & Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
160. Id. at § 1811.
161. Id. at § 1821.
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(6) A national program for the conservation and management
of fishing resources of the United States is necessary to prevent
overfishing, to rebuild overfished stocks, to insure conservation
and to realize the full potential of the Nation's fishing
resources. 1
62
By 1976, the United States exercised control over the living
and nonliving resources of the sea, seabed and subsoil within at
least two hundred miles offshore. Significant restrictions approach-
ing sovereignty were placed by the United States over foreign ves-
sels or developers despite our adherence to the three-mile limit.
Beginning in 1970, President Nixon announced the nation's
ocean policy expressly calling for recognition of a twelve-mile limit
as part of the Law of the Sea Treaty.'63 Despite our national pol-
icy, and our own extension of authority over the continental shelf,
we rejected Mauritania's expansion of its territorial sea to thirty
miles, still adhering to what we called the "traditional three-mile
limit."'" For support of our contention that nations were not free
to unilaterally decide the breadth of their territorial sea, the United
162. Id. at § 1801.
163. U.S. Policy For the Seabed, 62 DEP'T ST. BULL 737,738 (1970) (statement of Pres.
Nixon). Both houses, in their resolutions, accepted President Nixon's formulation of the
United States' ocean policy. President Nixon's policy statements included the following
statement regarding the twelve-mile limit:
It is equally important to assure unfettered and harmonious use of the oceans
as an avenue of commerce and transportation and as a source of food. For this
reason the United States is currently engaged with other states in an effort to obtain
a new law-of-the-sea treaty. This treaty would establish a 12 mile limit for territo-
rial seas and provide for free transit through international straits. It would also
accommodate the problems of developing countries and other nations regarding the
conservation and use of the living resources of the high seas.
Id at 738.
164. The statement was contained in a note from the American Embassy in Mauritania.
See ROVINE, DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (1973). Likewise, the
United States consistently challenged extended fishery jurisdiction legislation which banned
or restricted participation of American fishermen.
On March 16, 1970, the Department of State laid out its negotiating position three years
before the LOS Conference began in U.S. Outlines Position on limit of Territorial Sea, 62
DEP'T ST. BULL. 343 (1970).
The United States Government has recently been discussing the question of the proper
breadth limit for territorial seas with many nations. Widespread disagreement on the proper
breadth of the territorial sea makes it urgent that the community of nations attempt once
again to fix a limit. The United States supports the 12-mile limit as the most widely accepted
one, but only if a treaty can be negotiated which will achieve widespread international ac-
ceptance and will provide for freedom of navigation through and over international straits.
At the same time the United States will attempt to accommodate the interests of coastal
states in the fishery resources off their coasts.
The United States Government hopes this initiative will be successful. Until the objec-
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States relied upon the International Court of Justice's decision in
the Fisheries Case decided in 1951.165 By 1974, however, Ambassa-
dor John R. Stevensen, the United States Representative to the Law
of the Sea Conference, stated with reference to a twelve-mile limit:
The United States has for a number of years indicated our flex-
ibility on the limits of coastal state resources jurisdiction. We
have stressed that the content of the legal regime within such
coastal state jurisdiction is more important than the limits of
such jurisdiction. Accordingly, we are prepared to accept, and
indeed welcome general agreement on a 12 mile outer limit for
the territorial sea and a 200 mile limit for the economic zone and
provision for unimpeded transit of straits used for international
166navigation
Ironically, from 1945 to 1976, the United States embarked on a pol-
icy of adhering to the limited territorial sea thesis in its day-to-day
relationships with other nations, but in effect extending its own ju-
risdiction seaward. 67 For purposes of the Law of the Sea negotia-
tive is realized, the United States will continue to adhere to the position that it is not obliged
to recognize territorial seas which exceed three miles.
In August 1971, the United States made the following proposal as a draft for an accept-
ance compromise, U.S. Draft Articles on territorial Sea Straits & Fisheries, 65 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 266 (197 1) (submitted at U.N. Seabed Committee):
ARTICLE I
1. Each state shall have the right, subject to the provision of Article II, to estab-
lish the breadth of its territorial sea within limits of no more than 12 nautical miles,
measured in accordance with the provisions of the 1958 General Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
2. In instances where the breadth of the territorial sea of a State is less than 12
nautical miles, such State may establish a fisheries zone contiguous to its territorial
sea provided, however, that the total breadth of the territorial sea and fisheries zone
shall not exceed 12 nautical miles. Such State may exercise within such a zone the
same rights in respect to fisheries as it has in its territorial sea.
ARTICLE I1
1. In straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas
and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state, all ships
and aircraft in transit shall enjoy the same freedom of navigation and overflight, for
the purpose of transit through and over such straits, as they have on the high seas.
Coastal States may designate corridors suitable for transit by all ships and aircraft
through and over such straits. In the case of straits where particular channels of
navigation are customarily employed by ships in transit, the corridors, so far as
ships are concerned, shall include such channels.
2. The provisions of this Article shall not affect conventions or other interna-
tional agreements already in force specifically relating to particular straits.
165. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 !.C.J. 116, 142. See 36 DEP'T ST. BULL. 60, 62-
63 (1957).
166. U.S. Defines Position on 200-Mile Economic Zone at Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 71 DEP'T ST. BULL. 232-36 (1974) (statement by John Stevenson).
167. Id. See also Hollick, United States Oceans Policies, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 467
(1973) for an excellent discussion of the Strait issue and the underlying politics of our policy.
Dr. Hollick identified four domestic interests involved in formulating United States
ocean policy--the petroleum industry, the military, the hard minerals industry and the
Vol. 13
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tions, the country's position was one of support for a twelve-mile
limit.
Our major hesitation of full acceptance of the expanded limit
seemed to focus on insuring free use of international straits which
would run through these expanded territorial seas. This fear was
taken care of in the Law of the Sea Treaty's text. 6 ' Arguably, free
transit of international straits is customary international law in any
event. The International Court of Justice discussed its interpreta-
tion of customary international law and free passage through
straits:
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in
accordance with international custom that States in time of peace
have a right to send their warships through straits used for inter-
national navigation between two parts of the high seas without
the previous authorization of a coastal State, prescribed in an
international convention, there is no right of a coastal State to
marine science community. The petroleum industry wanted to ensure that the continental
shelf and margin was free from too much international control. The military on the other
hand was afraid that such a move would be followed by control over the supra adjacent
water, cutting off access to many areas of the world to the U.S. military.
Hollick points out that the Department of Defense was willing to sacrifice the interests
of the petroleum industry and the mining interests by proposing a 200-meter depth as the
outermost continental shelf boundary, and urge an impartial seabed authority for deep sea-
bed mineral mining. Marine scientists on the other hand supported free access, but were
willing to settle for explicit guarantees that marine scientists could have access to any area
for study.
The United States' first draft of a convention introduced in August 1973 was designed to
ensure a narrow Continental Shelf. However, the issues of the territorial sea and straits took
precedence. The United States would agree on a twelve-mile limit if freedom of transit
through straits was ensured. In addition, the United States sought preferential right in
fisheries beyond the territorial sea. This is a concept the United States implemented unilater-
ally in the Fishing Conservation and Management Act. See supra text accompanying notes
159-62.
168. The Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty takes care of the United States' problem over
the use of international straits with a twelve-mile territorial sea by creating two types of
passage through straits. The first type of passage is called transit passage. Transit passage is
defined in Article 38(2) as:
the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight
solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditorial transit of the strait between
one area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another area of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
Article 45 ensures innocent passage in straits excluded under Article 38(l) and when naviga-
tion is between one area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea
of a foreign state. The United States believed that transit passage was crucial to its package
of recognition of a twelve-mile limit. (Had innocent passage alone been provided for coastal
states, this could have seriously limited ocean transit.)
The importance of the inclusion of Transit Passage in the Treaty is discussed in Moore,
The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 AM.
J. INT'L L. 77 (1980).
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prohibit such passage through straits in time of peace. 169
Most commentators on international law believe that this custom
became an accepted principle of international law following the
Corfu Channel Case. 70
The principles enunciated by the Court have been incorpo-
rated into the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone which went into force in 1962, and the new Law of the Sea
Treaty. In light of the treatment of free passage through straits by
custom, court decision and convention, it would seem that this fac-
tor in the United States' reluctance to accept the expanded territo-
rial sea is without substance.
Consequently, it appears that this nation's objections and
resistance to an expanded territorial sea will not be recognized by
an international tribunal. With or without the Law of the Sea
Treaty, it is argued that the new customary breadth for the territo-
rial sea is twelve miles.
Do the same or different forces require a recognition of the
expanded exclusive economic zone? Inclusion of this zone in the
Law of the Sea Treaty has been deemed as a radical departure from
customary international law. Within the exclusive economic zone,
the coastal nation may exercise "sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing" the living and
nonliving resources of the sea up to two hundred nautical miles
from the shore of the coastal State.' 7 '
Vattel argued strongly that a nation had a right to appropriate
fisheries off its coast when required by the need for preservation
and consumption on the part of the coastal State. 72 Likewise, the
United States Supreme Court, in two cases decided in 1804 and
1808, recognized a right of nations to exercise control beyond their
territorial sea. 1 The Court argued that a nation has the power to
prevent injury to itself which may occur outside the territorial
sea. ' 74 The first zones created beyond the territorial sea were called
contiguous zones in which countries could exercise control to en-
force their customs and immigration regulations.
169. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 1, 28.
170. Waldoch, The International Court and Mke Law of the Sea, 5 INT'L L. PAMPHLETS,
No. 8 at 5-7.
171. Draft Convention, supra note 168, at 21.
172. E. VATTEL, supra note 79, at 127.
173. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187, 234, 2 Cranch (1804); Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S.
293 (4 Cranch) 175 (1808).
174. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. at 234.
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As evidenced by the United States' creation of an exclusive
fisheries zone, the international trend has been to expand control
over the resources of the water offshore beyond territorial seas.
Vattel appeared to recognize that more than the right of free trade,
the question of control of fisheries beyond the territorial sea of a
nation created the greatest potential for conflict between appropria-
tion and free use proponents.175 In fact, the extensions of the terri-
torial sea which occurred after the 1958 Convention were motivated
to a large extent by a desire to secure coastal fisheries for the coastal
State. Many nations created fishery zones extending beyond their
territorial seas in which foreign fishing was either banned alto-
gether or severely restricted.' 76 This theory has been in existence
for centuries, and actually practiced during the last twenty-five
years. It would appear, therefore, that the only revolutionary as-
pect of the exclusive economic zone in the treaty is the determina-
tion of a boundary. The United States would be hard pressed to
say that it rejected the existence or power of a nation to create such
a zone as a principle of international law. As with the twelve-mile
limit, it appears the United States must conform to the treaty's pro-
visions regardless of signature. Likewise, should the treaty be de-
stroyed by our failure to sign, the existence of the exclusive
economic zone would appear to be an internationally recognized
custom.
The final significant change that took place with the signing of
the treaty pertains to the control and development of the deep sea
bed. The eventual decision to create an international governing
body to regulate exploitation in the deep sea bed created the great-
est friction among nations. Underdeveloped nations strongly urged
that the sea bed should be governed entirely by the international
body, with no veto power by any developed countries. Developed
nations, especially the United States, which had developed technol-
ogy capable of exploiting the minerals from the sea bed, felt that
some guarantee that their citizens could participate in the mining
was needed. Furthermore, the developed nations believed they
should have some control, like a veto, over the decisions made by
the governing body.
The question which presents itself is whether there was or is a
175. E. VATTEL, supra note 79, at 127-28.
176. For example, Argentina expanded her fishery zone to twelve miles in 1966, Law No.
17, 094-M24; Brazil expanded her territorial sea to two hundred miles in 1970, with a one
hundred-mile exclusive fishery zone established in 1971.
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customary rule of international law which governs the exploitation
of the sea bed. Perhaps Vattel's argument that a nation has a right
to unilaterally appropriate scarce resources such as fisheries is ap-
plicable. Certainly this argument has been used to justify expan-
sion of coastal States' control over fisheries and the continental
shelf. However, several factors militate against such an analogy.
From the beginning of the realization that mining operations were
feasible in the deep sea bed, the international community has been
almost unanimous in agreeing that these resources are the common
heritage of mankind.'77 On this assumption, the United Nations
convened the Law of the Sea Conferences in 1970.178 The United
States, which first developed the technology to exploit the re-
sources, consistently took the position in adopted policy that these
resources were to be developed under the auspices of international
control. 179 At least one request for State Department sanction of an
exploration and development claim was rejected on this basis.' 80
177. Draft Convention, supra note 168, at 1. In the introductory notes to the Draft Con-
vention, the following statement of purpose is made:
Deserving by this Convention to develop the principles embodied in resolution
2749 (XXU) of 12 December 1970 in which the General Assembly solemnly de-
clared inter alia that the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as its resource, is the common
heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall be carried out
for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of
States.
Id
178. United Nations' General Assembly Resolution 2 574-D (XXIV 1969). Vol. XII
1968-69 1 (1975).
179. See for example Secretary of State Kissinger's remarks given in New York to the
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, reprinted in The Law of the Sea.- A Test of Interna-
tional Cooperation, 74 DEP'T ST. BULL. 533-42 (1976) (statement of Secretary of State, Henry
Kissinger.) In this speech, Secretary Kissinger proposed a parallel mining system which per-
mits both private and public mining. However, Secretary Kissinger was prepared to accept
an international authority to run the mining program.
President Lyndon Johnson made the following remarks at the Commissioning of the
new research Ship The Oceanographer on July 13, 1966:
Under no circumstances. . . must we ever allow the prospects of rich harvest and
mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime
nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under the
high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and re-
main, the legacy of all human beings.
180. U.S. Department f State: Statement on Claim of Exclusion Mining Rights By
Deepsea Ventures, Inc. (November, 1974), in which the State Department took the following
position:
The appropriate means for the development of the law of the sea is the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and not unilateral claims. The
United States supports the achievement of widely acceptable and comprehensive
Law of the Sea Treaty in 1975 that would include a regime and machinery for the
explanation for and exploration of the mineral resources of the deep seabed beyond
the limits of national jurisdictions.
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Although subsequently the United States adopted national legisla-
tion covering deep sea bed mining in 1980,181 the near-total agree-
ment that the deep sea bed should be developed by an international
body provides a strong case for establishing the general principle
of multinational development as customary law.
The United States, despite its national legislation covering na-
tional control, has consistently argued that control over the re-
sources of the high seas and sea bed beyond the margin of the
continental shelf should be internationally controlled. 182 A close
reading of the legislation adopted by the United States governing
sea bed development supports the argument that we are still com-
mitted to this view. Development license may not be granted until
1988, and only if an international agreement has not been
reached. 83 Any revenue acquired from activities condoned by the
Legislature is earmarked for an international fund for ten years. 84
Coupled with our historic national policy, the Legislature and near-
total international agreement before and after the signing of the
treaty, a very strong case could be presented against permitting uni-
lateral development of sea bed mining claims. In addition, the only
reason announced by the United States for refusing to sign the
treaty involves the decision making process for the sea bed created
under the treaty, not to the underlying regime created for interna-
tional development.
Consequently, it would appear that the United States, or com-
panies acting under the authority of the national legislation, may be
prohibited by an international tribunal from mining unless ap-
proved by the authority-if the treaty is merely codification of cus-
tomary law. The treaty, national policy and customary
international law militate against such unilateral development.
However, those nations arguing for a contractual relation may le-
gitimize the United States' refusal to sign.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, despite protesta-
tions to the contrary, has codified with almost unanimous interna-
181. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. IV 1980).
182. See supra notes 178 and 179.
183. 30 U.S.C. § 1412(c)(1)(d) (Supp. IV 1980). See also § 1401 which states in part that
the United States recognizes U.N. Resolution 2749(XXV) declaring the minerals on the deep
seabed the "Common heritage of mankind." Id.
184. 30 U.S.C. § 1472 (Supp. IV 1980).
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tional consent, customary law of the sea. With or without
successful implementation of the treaty, radical changes from early
twentieth century law of the sea regimes have become general prin-
ciples of international law.
International law now recognizes a twelve-mile territorial sea,
exclusive economic zones, and internationally sanctioned develop-
ment of the deep sea bed. The law of the sea has slowly evolved
from Grotius' free use regime to a modified Seldonian regime.
Without the treaty, the continued appropriation of vast areas of the
sea by individual coastal nations could and arguably would occur if
it were not for the customary regime of international development
of the sea bed. It is clear that these unilateral extensions have been
greeted with majority support of the nations of the world, making
such extension the new customary norm.
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